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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Gregory Nelson appeals from the district court's orders summarily 
dismissing his fifth and sixth petitions for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In affirming Nelson's convictions and sentences on direct appeal, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals described the underlying facts of Nelson's conviction as 
follows: 
According to the evidence presented at trial, appellant 
Gregory J. Nelson went to the home of K.M., a ten-year-old girl who 
lived in his neighborhood. Nelson knew that K.M.'s parents would 
not be home that morning because her father was in Alaska and 
her mother was at work. When Nelson arrived, he offered to pay 
K.M. twenty dollars if she would come and clean the travel trailer in 
which he lived. After an initial refusal, K.M. ultimately agreed, and 
Nelson drove her to his trailer. Shortly after they arrived and K.M. 
began cleaning, Nelson told K.M. that he was a doctor and that he 
wanted her to remove her shirt. When she refused, he knocked her 
down on the bed, held a pillow over her face until she agreed to 
remove her clothing, and then sexually molested her. After the 
incident, Nelson drove K.M. back to her house. Once there, K.M. 
immediately told her two brothers that Nelson had hurt her, and 
they took her to the house of a neighbor. The neighbor telephoned 
K.M.'s mother, who arrived a few minutes later as did police and 
paramedics. K.M. was then taken to a hospital where she was 
examined by a physician. 
State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210,213,953 P.2d 650, 653 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Ajury found Nelson guilty of first-degree kidnapping and lewd conduct with 
a minor. See id. The district court denied Nelson's motion for a new trial, and 
imposed concurrent fixed life sentences. See id. Nelson raised ten issues on 
direct appeal, including a claim that the district court erred in admitting physical 
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evidence for which, Nelson asserted, the state failed to establish an adequate 
chain of custody. kL. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Nelson's conviction 
and sentences. kL. 
Over the next several years, Nelson filed four unsuccessful petitions for 
post-conviction relief, asserting dozens of various claims. See #40661 R, 
pp.259-260; Nelson v. State, 2003 Unpublished Opinion No. 846, Docket No. 
27266 (Idaho App., September 22, 2003); Nelson v. State, 2005 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 524, Docket No. 30771 (Idaho App., June 28, 2005). 
In 2011, Nelson filed a fifth petition for post-conviction relief. requesting 
DNA testing of the rape kit and underwear admitted as evidence at the underlying 
trial. (#40661 R, pp.7-52.) The district court appointed counsel to represent 
Nelson. (#40661 3/3/11 Tr., p.13, L.9 - p.14, L.19.) Pursuant to stipulation 
between the parties. the district court ordered the requested testing. (#40661 R. 
pp.62-63, 67-69, 82.) The testing revealed that Nelson and his paternal relatives 
could not be excluded as the source of the male DNA profile obtained from the 
relevant evidence. (#40661, Respondent's exhibit 1.) The report summarized: 
Item 1 (Vaginal swabs): 
The partial T-STR DNA profile from the epithelial fraction of this 
item matches the Y-STR DNA profile obtained from Gregory 
Nelson. Gregory Nelson and his paternal relatives cannot be 
excluded as the source of the male DNA identified on this item. 
The Y-STR DNA profile was observed 13 times in a population of 
10986 individuals. Applying the 95% confident interval results in a 
frequency of 0.00188, which is equivalent to approximately 1 in 
.every 532 individuals. Analysis for the presence of additional male 
contributors was inconclusive. 
No Y-STR DNA profile was obtained from the sperm fraction. 
2 
(ld.) 
Item 2 (Anal swabs): 
The partial T-STR DNA profile from the epithelial fraction of this 
item matches the Y-STR DNA profile obtained from Gregory 
Nelson. Gregory Nelson and his paternal relatives cannot be 
excluded as the source of the male DNA identified on this item. 
The Y-STR DNA profile was not observed in a population of 10986 
individuals. Applying the 95% confident interval results in a 
frequency of 0.000273, which is equivalent to approximately 1 in 
every 3663 individuals. Analysis for the presence of additional 
male contributors was inconclusive. 
No Y-STR DNA profile was obtained from the sperm fraction. 
Shortly after the testing was completed, the state answered Nelson's post-
conviction petition and moved for its dismissal based upon the results of the 
testing. (#40661 R, pp.90-92, 179-182.) Nelson filed pro se motions seeking to 
replace his counseL (#40661 R, pp.93-113.) He also filed a pro se 
supplemental motion for post-conviction relief, supporting affidavits, and other 
filings, in which he appeared to assert that the Y-STR DNA analysis was 
insufficient because such testing cannot be linked to a specific individual, but is 
instead useful only in excluding individuals as DNA contributors. (#40661 R, 
pp.117-136, 170-174, 187-192, 227-232.) Nelson requested that "full STR" 
testing additionally be conducted. (ld.) STR testing, unlike Y-STR testing, 
Nelson asserted, would seek to identify the specific contributor of the DNA 
samples, and could be compared against the CODIS national DNA database. 
(Id.) 
The district court denied Nelson's motion for substitute counsel, and 
requested that Nelson's counsel respond to the state's motion for summary 
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dismissal. (#40661 R., pp,197-201; see also #40828 7/5/12 Tr., p.36, L.24 -
p.42, L. 7.) The district court also barred Nelson from continuing to file pro se 
documents. (#40661 R., pp.236-238.) Nelson's counsel filed an objection to the 
state's motion for summary dismissal, and requested that the court consider 
Nelson's previous pro se filings in which Nelson requested additional testing. 
(#40661 R, pp.253-254.) The district court considered the prior filings and then 
summarily dismissed Nelson's fifth post-conviction petition. (#40661 R, pp.259-
270.) 
In the course of his fifth post-conviction petition proceedings, Nelson 
asserted that evidence from his underlying trial had been tampered with. 
(#40661 R., pp.117-136, 170-174,187-192,197-200,227-232.) The district court 
stayed consideration of this claim pending the outcome of Nelson's fifth petition. 
(#40661 R, pp.197-201.) Nelson then formally asserted this claim in a sixth 
petition for post-conviction relief. (#40828 R, pp.6-75.) Nelson asserted that 
inconsistent labeling and descriptions of various exhibits demonstrated evidence 
tampering, (Id.) The district court entered a notice of intent to summarily dismiss 
the petition on the grounds that the tampering claim was frivolous, and the claim 
could have been and/or was previously raised on direct appeal or in Nelson's 
original post-conviction petition. (#40828 R, pp.76-80.) Nelson then moved for 
the appointment of counsel, and submitted additional argument. (#40828 R., 
pp.81-89, 97-114.) The district court denied Nelson's motion for appointment of 
counsel and summarily dismissed Nelson's sixth petition. (#40828 R, pp.115-
126.) 
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Nelson timely appealed from the district court's summary dismissal of his 
fifth and sixth petitions for post-conviction relief. (#40661 R., pp.271-274; 
#40828 R., pp.127-130.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted Nelson's motion to 
consolidate the two appeals. (6/10/13 Order.) 
5 
ISSUES 
Nelson states the issues on appeal as: 
A: In No. 40661: Did the District Court err in not ordering 
additional DNA testing when the YSTR testing did not 
identify Mr. Nelson as the source of the male DNA but also 
did not exclude him? 
B: In No. 40828: Did the Court err in failing to grant Mr. 
Nelson's motion for appointment of counsel, especially given 
the absence of advance notice of the reasons for the court's 
denial? 
(Appellant's brief, p.2) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Nelson failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 
request for additional DNA testing? 
2. Has Nelson failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 
motion for counsel with regard to his sixth post-conviction petition? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Nelson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Request For Additional DNA Testing 
A. Introduction 
Nelson contends that the district court erred by denying his request for 
additional DNA testing of relevant evidence associated with his underlying trial 
and conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp.3-12.) However, the record reveals that 
Nelson failed to make the required showing that the additional testing had the 
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that 
it was more probable than not that Nelson was innocent. 
8. Standard Of Review 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction application, the appellate 
court will review the entire record to determine if there is a genuine issue of 
material fact that, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require that relief be 
granted. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 
1992). The court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. Id. 
C. Nelson Was Not Entitled To Additional DNA Testing 
Under Idaho Code § 19-4902, a petitioner may file a post-conviction 
petition seeking DNA testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial 
that resulted in his conviction if the evidence was not subjected to the requested 
DNA testing because the technology was not available at the time of the trial. 
I.C. § 19-4902(b). The petitioner must present a prima facie claim that identity 
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was at issue in the trial and that the evidence was subject to a sufficient chain of 
custody. 1 I.C. § 19-4902(c). The district court must then allow the testing under 
reasonable conditions if the district court determines that: "(1) The result of the 
testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that 
would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent; and 
(2) The testing method requested would likely produce admissible results under 
the Idaho rules of evidence." I.C. § 19-4902(e). In the event testing is 
conducted, the court shall "order the appropriate relief" if the results demonstrate, 
in light of all admissible evidence, that the petitioner is not the person who 
committed the offense. I.C. § 19-4902(f) 
In this case, the parties stipulated to DNA testing. (#40661 R., pp.62-63, 
67 -69.) The stipulation and subsequent initial district court order did not specify 
what type of testing would be conducted. (Id.) However, at a pre-test hearing 
concerning the question of which entity was to pay for the testing, Idaho State 
Lab DNA supervisor Cynthia Cunnington stated that "the testing that is being 
requested in this case is referred to as Y{-]STR testing." (#40661 2/2/12 Tr., 
p.16, Ls.10-20; p.i7, Ls.19-22.) Nelson did not object to or attempt to clarify this 
1 Nelson was thus required to make a prima facie showing that "[t]he evidence to 
be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that such 
evidence has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced or altered in any 
material aspect." I.C. § 19-4902(c)(2). While the state did not dispute that 
Nelson made such a showing below (#40661 R., pp.51, 91), Nelson has also 
contradictorily argued, both on direct appeal and in his sixth post-conviction 
petition (see Sec. II, below), that the rape kit was tampered with and/or materially 
altered in some way. In fact, Nelson expressed at a hearing his view that "had 
{he] been made fully aware of the content of the [facts underlying his tampering 
allegation], [he] would have demanded that the DNA testing stop because it's 
pointless." (#408287/5/12 Tr., p.28, l.20 - p.29, L.4.) 
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characterization. (See generally #40661 2/2/12 Tr.) Following this hearing, the 
district court specifically ordered that Y-STR DNA testing be conducted, and that 
Nelson pay half the cost of such testing up to $3,000. (#40661 R., p.82.) 
Cunnington went on to explain some of the differences between Y-STR 
testing, which was conducted in this case, and STR testing. (#40661 2/2/12 Tr., 
p.i7, L.2. - p.20, L.12.) STR testing, Cunnington explained, "looks at DNA that 
everybody has, males, females," and "is looking at those unique portions of DNA 
to determine whether or not a specific individual could be the source of a given 
body fluid associated with the case." (#40661 2/2/12 Tr., p.i7, Ls.2-i8.) As 
other state appellate courts have recognized, however, "STR DNA analysis is 
problematic ... when forensic scientists are confronted with a mixed [male and 
female] DNA sample." Moore v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 470, 492, n.i6 (Ky. 
2011) (quoting State v. Calleia, 997 A.2d 1051, 1063 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010»). Such a mixed STR DNA profile "will have a combination of both 
individuals' DNA patterns and it is not possible to attribute which traits go with 
which person. Further, one individual's profile often overwhelms the other and 
renders it un-detectible." k1 
Y-STR testing, Cunnington explained, "is specific for males." (#40661 
2/2/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.19-25.) Y-STR testing is therefore commonly used in sexual 
battery cases where it is advantageous to separate male DNA from female DNA. 
See Commonwealth v. Linton, 924 N.E.2d 722, 732 n.8 (2010) (referencing 
testifying DNA analyst who "explained that Y -STR testing is often used when 
there is a large amount of female DNA and possibly only a small amount of male 
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DNA [as would be the case in many sexual batteries}. In such instances, 
standard DNA testing may 'drown out' the male contributor's DNA because so 
much female DNA is present."). Thus, while Y-STR testing, unlike STR testing, 
cannot establish who the singular contributor of a crime scene DNA source is, it 
may be more effective in excluding (and thus exonerating) innocent individuals in 
male/female sexual assault cases. 
In this case, Y-STR DNA testing revealed that Nelson and his paternal 
relatives could not be excluded as the source of the DNA profile identified on the 
relevant evidence from the underlying trial. (#40661, Respondent's exhibit 1.) 
Applying a 95% confident interval, the male DNA profile obtained from the 
vaginal swab of the victim is found in approximately 1 in every 532 individuals, 
while the male DNA profile obtained from the anal swab of the victim is found in 
approximately 1 in every 3663 individuals. (Id.) 
Following this testing, Nelson, through various pro se filings, requested 
that standard STR DNA testing also be conducted. (#40661 R., pp.117-136. 170-
174, 187-192,227-232.) Nelson described some of the comparative advantages 
and drawbacks to STR and Y-STR testing discussed above. (Id.) However, 
despite having an active communication with a consulting forensic scientist (see 
#40661, pp.254-258), Nelson did not support his request with statements from 
any experts asserting that in the circumstances of this case, Y-STR testing was in 
any way inadequate or inappropriate, or that STR testing had any reasonable 
probability of being favorable to Nelson in light of the Y-STR testing results 
already obtained. 
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The district court rejected Nelson's request for additional testing. 
concluding: 
Beyond laying the foundation for the evidence presented in Exhibits 
A and B to the Objection, [Nelson's] affidavit contains inadmissible 
hearsay, information outside the Petitioner's personal knowledge, 
and the Petitioner's legal conclusion, and therefore, are not 
considered further. To the extent that Mr. Nelson has read articles 
on DNA testing, even specifically cited National Geographic 
articles, he would still not qualify as an expert capable of rendering 
an admissible opinion under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Therefore, hearsay statements and the Petitioner's factual and 
legal conclusions related to COOlS STR DNA testing in the First 
and Second Affidavits do not present a genuine issue of material 
fact that the Petitioner was not the one who committed these 
offenses. 
(#40661 R., p.266.) 
Nelson's failure to provide evidentiary support is fatal to his claim. Nelson 
is not entitled to engage in a fishing expedition involving multiple DNA tests. A 
petitioner must support such requests with admissible evidence, beyond his own 
opinions of the usefulness of such tests, explaining why prior testing was so 
flawed, and/or how additional requested testing is so potentially illuminating and 
not merely cumulative, as to create the scientific potential to reveal evidence 
demonstrating that it was more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent. 
See Moore, 357 S.W.3d at 491-492 (recognizing, in a case presenting a mirror 
image of the circumstance of the present case, that where a petitioner had 
already obtained STR testing, but additionally sought Y-STR testing, that 
petitioner must support such a claim "by expert proof about the usefulness of the 
proposed testing"). Nelson has failed to make such a showing. 
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While Nelson submitted unsworn letters from consulting forensic scientist 
George Schiro in support of his objection to the state's motion for summary 
dismissal, these letters are not helpful to Nelson's cause. Nelson submitted the 
Y-STR testing results to Schiro to review. (See #40661 R., pp.253 w 258.) In 
response, Schiro stated that "a review of the notes indicates that Sorenson 
Forensics carried out the testing properly and that the results of the test are 
valid," and that H[b]ased on the current state of DNA testing and the information 
provided so far, I will not be able to assist you with your case." (#40661 R., 
p.256.) 
Further, in light of the results of the Y-STR test, there is no reasonable 
probability that additional testing would demonstrate Nelson's innocence. 
Notably, I.C. § 19-4902 does not require a district court to assume test results 
favorable to the petitioner when determining whether to order DNA testing.2 In 
2 This distinguishes I.C. § 19-4902 from the corresponding post-conviction DNA 
testing statutes of several other jurisdictions which do expressly require the 
district court to assume exculpatory results when analyzing whether a petitioner 
has made the required materiality showing. .E&. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18w 1-
413{1 )(a) (a petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (a) 
"Favorable results of the DNA testing will demonstrate the petitioner's actual 
innocence"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54 w 102kk(b)(1) (a court must order DNA testing if 
petitioner shows "(a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not 
have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained 
through DNA testing"); 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1(c)(3)(ii) (petitioner must 
present a prima facie case demonstrating that "DNA testing of the specific 
evidence, assuming exculpatory results, would establish" actual innocence or 
support a lesser sentence in a capital case); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.035(7)(1) 
(petitioner must show a "reasonable probability exists that the movant would not 
hsve been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through the 
requested DNA testing" (emphasis added»; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-7-8(4); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 422.285(5)(a); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.0918(7)(a). If the Idaho 
legislature wished to remove the judicial determination of the likelihood of 
exculpatory results, it could have done so. 
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light of this previous testing which demonstrated some degree of certainty that he 
was the perpetrator, Nelson cannot show a reasonable probability that new DNA 
testing would produce exculpatory result. 3 Nelson thus cannot meet the 
materiality requirement of I.C. § 19-4902 
Nelson has failed to show that any additional DNA testing had the 
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that 
it is more probable than not that he is innocent of the crimes for which he was 
convicted. He has therefore failed to show he is entitled to additional DNA 
testing, or that the district court abused its discretion in denying such testing. 
II. 
Nelson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion 
For Counsel With Regard To His Sixth Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Nelson contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion for the appointment of counsel with regard to his sixth post-conviction 
petition, in which Nelson asserted that "new evidence" revealed tampering of 
evidence associated with his underlying trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-19.) In the 
alternative, he contends that the district court failed to provide adequate notice 
prior to denying his motion for appointment of counsel. (Appellant's brief, p.19.) 
A review of the record reveals that there was no possibility that Nelson's 
3 Additionally, it appears that the district court did not take judicial notice of the 
transcripts of the underlying jury trial. (See #40828 7/5/12 Tr., p.45, L.14 - p.47, 
L.11; #40661 R., p.200.) Thus, it is not possible from the appellate record to 
analyze how STR testing might have been more appropriate, or more 
illuminating, and not merely cumulative, relative to Y-STR testing in the context of 
the facts of th is case. 
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tampering claim could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance 
of counsel, and that the court therefore acted within its discretion to deny the 
motion. Further, the district court's notice of intent to dismiss Nelson's petition 
contained adequate notice of the grounds the court later utilized to deny Nelson's 
motion for appointment of counsel and summarily dismiss his petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to 
. 
represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary. 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Plant v. 
State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007). 
C. Counsel Was Properly Denied Because Nelson's Claim Is Frivolous 
Idaho Code § 19-4901(4) permits a post-conviction petitioner to seek relief 
on the grounds that "there exists evidence of material facts, not previously 
presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the 
interest of justice." 
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies 
financially and "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a 
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to 
conduct a further investigation into the claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
655, 152 P.3d 12, 16 (2007); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 
102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004); I.C. § 19-4904. If the claims are so patently frivolous 
that there appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim 
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even with the assistance of counsel, however, the court may deny the motion for 
counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-
conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 
(2007); Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004). 
"Some claims are so patently frivolous that they could not be developed into 
viable claims even with the assistance of counsel." Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 
168, 172, 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011). Application of this standard to 
Nelson's tampering claim shows no error by the trial court. 
The remedy available under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
("UPCPA") "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to. the 
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction." 
I.C. § 19-4901(b). In addition, an "issue which could have been raised on direct 
appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction 
proceedings" except under very limited circumstances. I.C. § 19-4901 (b). 
Additionally, all grounds for relief available to a post-conviction petitioner 
must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. I.C. § 19-
4908. Any ground not previously raised is waived unless the court finds 
"sufficient reason" for why the claim was not asserted or was inadequately raised 
previously. kh 
In his sixth post-conviction petition, Nelson asserted that inconsistent 
labeling and descriptions of various exhibits demonstrated evidence tampering". 
(#40828 R., pp.6-75.) On appeal, Nelson has described these alleged 
inconsistencies as follows: 
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The petition alleged, as has been noted above, that an inventory of 
the contents of the rape kit was conducted in No. 40661, pursuant 
to the stipulation of the parties. A copy of that inventory (cal/ed a 
"Forensic Biology Report") dated June 28, 2011, and signed by 
Cynthia Cunnington, was attached as an Exhibit to the petition. The 
inventory describes Item Q-13 as "A glue-sealed white envelope 
containing two wooden toothpicks." A pre-trial inventory of the rape 
kit by the FBI described the contents of the rape kit to be "[a] white 
envelope labeled 'Step 1 - Special Evidence (if applicable) use 
swab for dried secretions or genital swabbings[.]!I' The inventory 
also states, "I marked this Q-13-40328002S YB and initialed and 
dated it. Envelope sealed." Mr. Nelson alleged the FBI forensic 
scientist Frederick Whitehurst and a nurse testified at the trial that 
the Q-13 contained "genital swabbings" and not toothpicks. Mr. 
Nelson also alleged that the lab notes of Forensic Scientist Ann 
Bradley indicated that she opened Q-13 prior to trial and found the 
envelope contained a[n] "external genital swab." 
There is also a discrepancy between the various descriptions 
of Q-11. The Sorenson Forensic notes say "01L.pubic hair 
combings," which would be consistent with Fredrick Whitehurst's 
.testimony at trial. However, the June 28, 2011, inventory reports 
the contents of 0-11 as "moist genital swabs." 
Finally, Mr. Nelson alleged that State's Exhibit 6, K.M.'s 
underwear, was tampered with because the descriptions of the 
exhibit do not match in that some witnesses at trial did not mention 
the exhibit had a cutting from the crotch while other inventories did 
mention a cutting. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-14 (citations omitted); see also #40828 R., pp.6-75.) 
Nelson presented his concerns about these apparent inconsistencies to 
consulting forensic scientist George Schiro. (#40661 R., pp.257-258.) Schiro 
responded and dispelled Nelson's tampering claims, stating, "(U]pon review of 
the documents that you sent to me, I do not think that there that was tampering of 
the rape kit contents." (ld.) With regard to the apparent labeling discrepancy 
involving exhibit 013, Schiro wrote, "[iJt has been my experience that some rape 
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kit manufactures include a muti-purpose envelope to collect additional evidence 
that might be present. Based on the descriptions, this envelope could have been 
used to collect 'special evidence,' such as fingernail scrapings, dried secretions, 
and/or genital swabbings. The toothpicks would have been to collect fingernail 
scrapings," (Id.) With regard to the apparent labeling discrepancy involving 
exhibit 011, Schiro wrote, "The Idaho State Police Forensic Services' description 
of 011 is obviously different than the FBI and Sorenson Forensics' description of 
Q 11; however, this could simply be a mistake on the report that has made its way 
through the system. I have seen similar mistakes on finalized reports before." 
(ld.) 
After providing notice, and after denying Nelson's motion for appointment 
of counsel, the district court summarily dismissed Nelson's sixth post-conviction 
petition. (#40828 R., pp.76-89, 115-126.) The court concluded that Nelson's 
tampering claim was "frivolous, successive and/or waived." (#40828 R., pp.119-
124.) 
A review of the record supports the district court's determination that 
Nelson's tampering claim was so patently frivolous that there existed no 
possibility that it could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance 
of counsel. The claim is entirely speculative. Nelson has presented no 
SUbstantive evidence of tampering, or evidence that the r~pe kit was 
inappropriately opened or altered in any way. The fact that individuals working 
for different entities described and inventoried evidence differently over a number 
of years does not itself demonstrate any reasonable probability that any 
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tampering of evidence occurred. Additionally, the state did not even utilize DNA 
testing to secure Nelson's underlying conviction (see #40661 R., pp.90-91), and 
instead appeared to rely primarily on the victim's testimony. Nelson, 131 Idaho at 
219, P.2d at 659. Nelson has not even attempted to speculate how any 
"tampering" of evidence contributed to his convictions. 
The district court's conclusion that Nelson waived the tampering claim by 
failing to assert it on direct appeal or in his initial post-conviction petition is also 
supported by the record. Nelson has not shown he lacked access to the relevant 
evidence at the time of trial and shortly afterward. In fact, on direct appeal, 
Nelson made a similar and unsuccessful chain of custody claim based upon 
apparently inconsistent descriptions of admitted evidence from the rape kit. kL at 
216-217,953 P.2d at 656-657. While it is true that Nelson did not have access to 
the Sorenson Forensic or Cunnington notes and written inventories (and their 
apparent inconsistencies with pre-trial notes and inventories) until 2011 or 2012, 
those latter notes themselves, which merely describe previously admitted 
evidence, do not constitute "material facts" that create any possibility of a 
successful claim. 
The failure to present any admissible, non-conclusory evidence on this 
claim rendered it frivolous. The claim is also waived due to Nelson's failure to 
raise it previously. Nelson has therefore failed to show error by the district court 
in either dismissing his petition or denying his motion for appointment of counsel. 
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D. The District Court Provided Adequate Notice Prior To Denying Nelson's 
Motion For Appointment Of Counsel, And Summarily Dismissing His Sixth 
Post-Conviction Petition 
In the alternative, Nelson contends that the district court failed to provide 
him adequate notice prior to denying his motion for appointment of counsel with 
regard to his sixth post-conviction petition. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) 
Nelson's contention fails because the district court's notice of intent to dismiss 
the petition contained adequate notice of the grounds the court later utilized to 
deny Nelson's motion for appointment of counsel and summarily dismiss his 
petition. 
"When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is 
contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to 
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissaL" Banks v. State, 
123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993) (citations omitted); seealso I.C. § 
19-4906(b). The purpose of the notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to give 
the petitioner the opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,418, 
825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991); State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487,489,632 P.2d 
676,678 (1981); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 892 P.2d 488,493 (Cl. 
App.1995). 
In this case, the district court set forth three proposed grounds for 
dismissal in its notice of intent to summarily dismiss Nelson's petition: (1) 
Nelson's tampering claim was frivolous; (2) Nelson waived the tampering claim 
by failing to present it on direct appeal; and (3) Nelson waived the tampering 
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claim by failing to present in his initial post-conviction petition. (#40828 R., 
pp.76-80.) With regard to the ground that Nelson's claim was frivolous, (Le., that 
there was no possibility it could be developed into a viable claim), the court 
further opined that Nelson failed to show that the "new evidence" was "not 
previously presented and heard," as required by I.C. § 19-4901(b), and that 
Nelson's own consulting forensic scientist did not believe the rape kit contents 
had been tampered with. (Id.) The district court's subsequent summary 
dismissal order referenced each of these three grounds and associated sub-
grounds, including I.C. § 19-4901(b), and the letter from Nelson's consulting 
forensic scientist. (#40828 R, pp.119-123.) In fact, significant portions of the 
district court's notice and dismissal order are identical. (Compare #40828 R, 
pp.76-80 with pp.119-123.) Additionally, the district court's order denying 
Nelson's motion for appointment of counsel also referenced the court's 
conclusion that Nelson's tampering claim was frivolous, in that it did not appear to 
give rise to the possibility of a valid c1aim.4 (#40828 R., pp.115-118.) Because 
4 Nelson relies on Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d 138 (2001), for his 
contention that a district court must provide adequate notice for not only its 
summary dismissal of a petition, but also for its denial of a motion for 
appointment of counsel. (Appellant's brief, p.19.) In the present case, after 
providing notice of its intent to summarily dismiss Nelson's petition, the district 
court entered separate orders, on the same day, denying Nelson's motion for 
appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing his petition. (#40828 R, 
pp.115-123.) Nelson appears to contend that even if the district court's dismissal 
order referenced the same grounds as were contained in the court's notice of 
intent to dismiss, the court still erred if those same grounds did not also appear in 
the court's order denying Nelson's motion for the appointment of counsel. The 
.~ state submits that Brown does not compel such a distinction. Clearly, the district 
court in the present case both denied Nelson's motion for appointment of 
counsel, and summarily dismissed his petition, because it found that Nelson's 
tampering claim was frivolous and/or waived. The two orders individually and 
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the district court's notice of intent to dismiss the petition contained adequate 
notice of the grounds the court later utilized to deny Nelson's motion for 
appointment of counsel and summarily dismiss his petition, Nelson has failed to 
show error. 
Further, even if the district court's notice of dismissal was somehow 
inadequate, any such error was harmless. If a petitioner is "not left with an 
'invisible target' and is able to respond in a meaningful way to the district court's 
notice of intent to dismiss," then any lack of adequate notice is harmless. 
Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 422-423, 128 P.3d 948, 958-959 (Ct. App. 2005); 
see also Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 671, 152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App. 
2006) ("Nevertheless, if Franck-Teel's response to the state's motion for 
summary dismissal reveals that she understood the basis for dismissaL., then 
we will conclude that the inadequacy of notice was harmless error."). 
In this case, Nelson responded to the district court's notice of intent to 
dismiss by filing a motion for appointment of counsel and supporting affidavits. 
(#40828 R., pp.81-114.) In the affidavits, Nelson responded to the district court's 
proposed grounds for dismissal and continued to argue the merits of his claim. 
(Id.) Specifically, he argued that he was not aware of the full contours of the 
tampering claim until 2012. (Id.) On appeal, Nelson does not attempt to explain 
what additional argument or evidence he would have provided if only the district 
court had provided a more substantial notice of dismissal. Therefore, even to the 
extent the district court's notice was inadequate, any such error was harmless. 
collectively referenced substantially the same grounds that were contained in the 
district court's notice of intent to dismiss. 
21 
The district court's notice of intent to dismiss was sufficient to put Nelson 
on notice that it intended to deny his motion for appointment of counsel and 
summarily dismiss his sixth post-conviction petition. Further, even if the district 
court's notice was somehow inadequate, any such error was harmless. This 
Court should therefore affirm the district court's order denying Nelson's motion for 
appointment of counsel, and it summary dismissal of the petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders· denying Nelson's fifth and sixth petitions for post-conviction relief, and its 
order' denying his motion for appointment of counsel with regard to his sixth 
petition. 
DATED this 13th day of March, 2014. 
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